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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the agency costs of multinational companies (MNC) in relation to
agency theory in Malaysian business environment. Using the data of 235 MNCs, this
study explores their demand for monitoring costs and these companies' preferences
between the monitoring costs components. The data is collected using primary and
secondary data. Multiple regression analysis and independent t-tests are conducted to
analyze the data.
The result indicates that multinational companies demand significantly higher monitoring
costs compared to domestic companies. However, the relationship between these
companies and their preference between the components of the monitoring mechanisms,
that is between directorship and auditing as their monitoring mechanism is not significant.
But when the auditing components are further investigated, it reveals that multinational
companies would demand more external audit costs compared to internal audit costs.
These results are supported by series of independent t-test which indicate that there are
significant differences between the demands for monitoring of multinational companies as
compared to their domestic counterparts.
Keywords: agency costs, monitoring, MNC, domestic companies.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
With globalization of businesses, the number of international organizations is steadily
increasing. It is claimed that the importance of multinationalisation is growing exponentialiy and
play an increasingly important role in business (Chang and Taylor, 1999). The dramatic global
developments encourage companies to do business across their national boundaries as the
world is borderless. In addition to selling their products abroad, more organisations are setting
up production facilities across national boundaries to avail business and investment
opportunities (Rahman, 2004).
Yudaeva et al. (2003) claim that foreign investment is one of the major sources of sustainable
economic growth in transition economies as this investment bring foreign technologies into the
countries and facilitate knowledge exchange and adoption of modern production techniques via
copying of foreign production methods and technology know-how, as weli as add to the
country's managerial capital. Foreign investment is also said to increase competition and
stimulate the process of innovation, improvements in product design and output composition.
Yudaeva et al. (2003) find that foreign own organisations tend to be more productive than
domestic ones. These companies are calied 'multinational companies' (MNCs) and are defined
as a group of geographicaliy dispersed and goal-disparate organisations that include its head
quarters and the different national subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990) with different
ethnicities and cultural values intertwined and may cause interpersonal conflicts. However, as
the parent companies find that by investing in foreign subsidiaries, they increase the risk of
return on their investment, they are wiliing to take the chance. To ensure this goal is achieved,
the parent companies wili attempt to increase control over their foreign subsidiaries to reduce
the uncertainty of these investments. And the heart of control is the monitoring process (Baliga
& Jaeger, 1984). A lot of studies have been conducted to examine these MNCs, however, most
previous studies focus on how these MNCs affect the productivity (Yudaeva et aI., 2003),
ownership by MNCs (Chang and Taylor, 1999), performance of MNCs (Boardman et aI., 1997);
capital structure of MNCs (Mitto and Zhang, 2008; Aggarwal and Kyaw, 2010) and corporate
governance of MNCs (Luo, 2005; Kim et aI., 2005). Little attention is given to the monitoring
costs involved in managing the MNCs. Thus, this study is conducted to examine the monitoring
costs incurred by MNCs, and it also investigates the preferences of the monitoring cost
components involved.
It is also claimed that the number of MNCs has also increased in developing countries, thus this
study will focus on MNCs in Malaysia, which is one of the developing countries in Asia.
Statistics show that in Malaysia, foreign investment has been significant in contributing to its
economic progress by assisting in technology transfer, joint venture, licensing, franchising,
management contract, technical service contract, marketing contract and international
subcontracting (Beaumont, 1990; Rahman, 2004). A study on Malaysian companies by
Ramasamy (1999) reveals that the number of MNCs in Malaysia has increased where he finds
207 such compa.nies on the main board of Malaysian Exchange. It is reported that foreign direct
investment is on an increasing trend in Malaysia with an average annual rate of 8.2 percent,
which is from RM3.8 biliion in 1983 to RM6.1 biliions in 1989, and this value is tripled in 1994 to
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RM18.3 billions (Rahman, 2004). Thus, this study recognises these investments by MNCs in
Malaysia by investigating their monitoring costs.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a review of the relevant literature which leads to
hypotheses development, and Section 3 provides a description of the methodology used for this
study. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis, and finally the last
section concludes the study.
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Agency theory and MNCs
Previous studies claim that the monitoring of MNCs can be done through the extended agency
relationship between a corporation and its subsidiaries. The extended agency relationship
between a corporation and its foreign subsidiaries is described by Ekanayake (2004) as the two
levels of principal-agent relationship that exist in the management control system, that is
between the organisation's owners (the principal) with the top management (the agent), and
between the top management (acting as principal) and the divisional managers, as the agents
who manage the decentralised units. This extended relationship is also believed to affect the
monitoring costs of the organisation because of its cultural distance, strategic and operational
role, and commitment and psychological alignment, which are critical in influencing goal
incongruence and information asymmetry within the headquarters- foreign subsidiary
relationship (Roth & O'Donnell, 1996; Egolhoff, 1984; Luo, 2005; Nimie, 2005).
The agency theory models the relationship between principals who engage the agents to
perform some service on their behalf, and this may involve delegating some decision making
authority to the agents (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Human beings are assumed to
be risk averse and self interested in nature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, there is a high
potential for agents and principals to differ in their preferences for outcomes (Fama, 1980)
where the agents may make decisions that reduce their own risks at the expense of the
principal. However, principals will not be able to control the agents' behaviour, they can only
bear the risk and uncertainty about what the agents are actually doing, and this is call "agency
cost". In a domestic company, this relationship can be clearly seen in the shareholders and
CEO / management relationship, where management may decide to invest in projects with
negative or sub-optimal present value in order to maximise their own interest (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). However, in complex organisations of multiple business units and layers of
management, CEO of a large corporation can be viewed as the principal as he is most directly
charged with looking after the interest of the organisation as a whole, and the managers of
various subunits held by the corporation as the agents (Chang & Taylor, 1999). Under this
extended relationship, managers of the subunits may attempt to maximise their self-interest and
the interest of their subunits, even though this may have a negative implication on the
corporation as a whole. Chang & Taylor further describe the relationship between the
headquarters (the principal) and its foreign subsidiaries (the agent) under this extended agency
theory, where the parent company invests funds and resources in the subsidiaries and the
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subsidiaries in turn are expected to work for the benefit of the parent headquarters. However,
the geographic distance and national adaptation requirement between the headquarters and
their foreign subsidiaries may increase the corporate headquarters uncertainty about the
appropriateness of the subsidiaries decisions (Luo, 2005).
Roth & O'Donnell (1996) claim that cultural distance, strategic and operational role, and
commitment and psychological alignment are critical in influencing goal incongruence and
information asymmetry within the headquarters- foreign subsidiary relationship. This is also
noted by Egolholff (1984) who claim that the complex environment of MNCs and the physical
and cultural distances make control and monitoring for the parent-subsidiary level a much
greater problem in multinational than in domestic companies. This is supported by Nimie (2005)
who argue that foreign subsidiaries require additional control over management because of the
conflict of interest between the management of the subsidiaries and the foreign corporate owner
may be magnified by geographical distance and national objectives. The owners would be
concerned with SUb-optimisation where the actions taken should be beneficial to the subsidiary
but also optimal for the organisation as a whole. However, managers of subsidiaries may favour
the perceived interest of the national subsidiary rather than the overall interest of the
organisation. Consequently, the need for monitoring is higher in foreign subsidiaries of MNCs
than in domestically owned subsidiaries. This is supported by Luo (2005) who claim that the
complexity of global operation, task programmability and behaviour verifiability when an
organisation becomes more globalised are more difficult to monitor and will increase agency
costs.
Some MNCs resort to monitor the subsidiaries through staffing control, which is by appointing
managers/ directors whose nationality is the same as that of the headquarters. This is
consistent with the concept of behaviour control, where the managers/directors are expected to
be more likely to act in accordance with headquarters interests than are foreign managers
(Egolhoff, 1984; Baliga & Jaegar, 1984; Chang & Taylor, 1999). This has been exercised by
Japanese MNCs, where they are said to use their parent nationals extensively in their top and
middle management position in all their foreign operations (Tung, 1984). Therefore they can
monitor the subsidiaries through the directors that they choose and appoint. Eisenhardt (1989)
support this move by citing that another way of monitoring is to invest in monitoring system such
as budgetary system, board of directors and additional layers of management. However, MNCs
also need to look for other kind of control and monitoring as MNCs may be forced to utilise more
national managers and fewer expatriates due to pressures from host country statutes that limit
expatriates employment. Another solution to this is for the MNCs to choose auditing as their
monitoring mechanism. This is agreed by Baliga & Jaeger (1984) who view control as the
monitoring processes used by MNCs to verify that the activities and decisions of the different
affiliates yield results consistent with overall goals and strategies. One of the ways to verify the
activities of the subsidiaries, which is normally used by organisations, is through auditing
(external and internal aUditing).
In a Malaysian study by Che Ahmad, Houghton, & Mohamed Yusof (2006), it is argued that
foreign companies will incur more agency costs as the distance of the head-quarter induce a
higher level of management monitoring and provides incentives for them to hire quality auditors.
They also claim that "brand name" auditors are likely to be hired due to perceived needs of
international standards and high quality auditing of these organisations. This is supported by an
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earlier study in US, by Eichenseher (1985), who reveals strong evidence of the tendency of
MNCs to employ brand name auditors as compared to domestic companies.
Hypotheses development
A MNC is defined as a group of geographically dispersed and goal-disparate organisations that
include its head quarters and the different national subsidiaries (Groshal & Bartlett, 1990), with
different ethnicities and cultural values intertwined which may cause interpersonal conflicts. To
ensure this goal is achieved, the parent companies will attempt to increase control over their
foreign subsidiaries to reduce the uncertainty of their investments. It is believed that foreign
subsidiaries require additional control over management because of the conflict of interests
between the management of the subsidiaries and the foreign corporate owners, as magnified by
geographical distance and national objectives (Egolholff, 1984; Nimie, 2005). Egolholff (1984)
also claims that the complex environment of MNCs and the physical and cultural distances
make control and monitoring for the parent-subsidiary level a much greater problem in
multinational than in domestic companies. Therefore, it is argued that companies with foreign
subsidiaries or companies with multinational status will demand different level of monitoring
mechanisms as compared to domestic companies. In other words, the multinational status of
the organisation will affect the organisation's demand for monitoring mechanisms.
The headquarters of MNCs would also be concerned with sub-optimisation where the actions
taken should be beneficial to the subsidiary as well as for the organisation as a whole. However,
managers of subsidiaries may favour the perceived interest of the national subsidiary rather
than the overall interest of the organisation. Consequently, it is argued that the need for
monitoring is higher in foreign subsidiaries of MNCs than in domestically owned subsidiaries
(Egolholff, 1984; Nimie, 2005). This is supported by the findings of a study by Luo (2005) which
claims that the compleXity of global operation, task programmability and behaviour verifiability
when an organisation becomes more globalised are more difficult to monitor and will increase
agency costs. Hence, it is hypothesised that:
H( A multinational company has a greater total monitoring cost (from directorship and auditing)
compared to a domestic company.
Previous literature also argues that MNCs report their results in more detail compared to
companies operating in one country only (Jaggi & Low, 2000). Logically, when more details are
reported, there will be more things for the auditors to audit, which lead to more audit effort to be
put in, and consequently more audit fees will be charged. Niemi (2005) also claims that audit
fees should be higher for the subsidiaries of foreign companies than their domestically owned
counterparts because of the added complexity in its financial reporting structure and greater
need for corporate governance in foreign owned subsidiaries. This is particularly due to the fact
that additional sets of financial statements may be prepared in multiple languages and involve
foreign currency transformation and transfer pricing, which will require additional audit efforU
procedures and fees.
In addition, Luo (2005) cites that one of the effects of global competition for MNCs on corporate
governance is through its monitoring mechanism, the competition is getting tougher, the
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agency's global organising and decision making should be largely output-based, which requires
operational flexibility of the foreign subsidiaries. In this case, the power should be decentralised.
Therefore, the need for an assurance system, such as auditing is important to ensure that the
power delegated is not misused and the decisions made by the managers /directors of the
subsidiaries are in the best interest of the organisation as a whole. It is argued that in this
circumstance the independence and opinion of the auditors is highly valued as a monitoring
mechanism to be emphasised compared to directorship. Therefore, it is hypothesised that:
H2: A multinational organisation has a relatively lower expenditure on monitoring from
directorship compared to auditing (internal and external)
It is also argued that in a foreign-subsidiary relationship, the distance of the head-quarter
induces a higher level of management monitoring and this further provides incentives for them
to hire quality and brand name auditors (Che Ahmad et aI., 2006). Brand name auditors are
likely to be hired due to perceived needs of international standards and high quality auditing of
these organisations, which operate internationally and involve complex transactions (such as
consolidated accounts, more detail reporting and currency transformation). This is supported by
an earlier study in US, by Eichenseher (1985), who reveals strong evidence of the tendency of
MNCs to employ brand name auditors as compared to domestic companies. Hence, it is argued
that in a MNC, the need for an assurance system from a third party that is independent of the
organisation, such as external auditing is highly valued than internal auditing, to ensure that the
complex transactions are being taken care. This is also because internal auditors are viewed as
less independent than external auditors, due to the fact that internal auditors are the staff of the
organisation and report to the management of the organisation (Messier and Boh, 2004, p. 10).
In Addition, parent companies would normally request a brand name auditor with international
reputation (Che Ahmad et aI., 2006) be appointed to ensure that the decisions and transactions
carried out by the subsidiaries are in the best interest of the organisation as a whole and
consistent with international standards. Therefore, it is hypothesised that:
H3: A multinational organisation has a relatively lower expenditure on monitoring from
internal auditing compared to external auditing.
3.0 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data and sample
Data for the study was collected using primary (questionnaires) and secondary sources (annual
reports). The population of the study includes all 867 companies listed on the Main and Second
Board of Bursa Malaysia. However, the companies classified under finance sector were
excluded in this study because of their unique features and business activities, as well as
differences in compliance and regulatory requirements (Yatim et aI., 2006). The response rate
was 27%, with 235 usable samples used in the study. Data was analysed using regression
analysis and independent t-test.
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3.2. Models and Variable definition
There are three models to test the three hypotheses. And there are three dependent variables,
one dependent variable for each model.
The first model tests hypothesis 1 (H,):
MONITOR = aj + b,MNC + y(Control variables) + Ej Model 1
Where the dependent variable is the monitoring costs of the companies listed in Malaysian
Exchange. Directorship and auditing (internal and external) are specified as monitoring
mechanisms in the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (FCCG, 2001). This total
Monitoring (MONITOR) is measured by the sum of organization investment in non-executive
directors' remunerations, internal auditors' costs, and external auditors' costs.
The second model test hypothesis 2 (H2):
DIRAUD = aj + b,MNC + y(Control variables) + Ej Model 2
Where the dependent variable is the ratio of total directors' remuneration to total auditing. This
model test the hypothesis relating to the preference between directorship and auditing.
The third model test hypothesis 3 (H3):
INT EXT = aj + b,MNC + y(Control variables) + Ej Model 3
Where the dependent variable is the ratio of the total internal audit costs to total external audit
costs. This model test the hypothesis reiating to the preference between internal auditing and
external auditing.
The independent variable in all models is the multinational status of the company (denoted by
MNC) which is a dummy variable, where 1 represent company with multinational status, while 0
for non-multinational company, or domestic company.
Previous studies defined a MNC as any company with production facilities in two or more
countries (Martinez & Ricks, 1989), but under one guiding direction (Galbraith, 1978). Some
studies emphasise the extent of control over the foreign affiliates. Ramasamy (1999) quotes
Dunning (1993), who claims that a MNC should own and control value-adding activities in more
than one country. Ramasamy (1999) quotes United Nations (1973) which defines MNCs as
organisations that control assets - factories, mines, sales office and the like- in two or more
countries. This is supported by Khan (1986), as quoted by Ramasamy (1999), who states that,
the ownership of production and service facilities is a necessary pre-requisite of a MNC. Hence
a mere investment holding company across the border would probably fail to meet this pre-
requisite, as it may not exert effective control over the affiliate company. Thus, this study defines
a MNC as a company which operates in at least two countries (as defined by Martinez & Ricks,
1989; Galbraith, 1978), and its parent company holds at least 20 percent equity in its
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international subsidiaries (as used by Ramasamy, 1999; Rahman, 2004) or control at least 10
percent of its assets (as used by Michel & Shaked, 1986; Collins, 1990).
The controlled variables include in this study are size, complexity, growth and listing status.
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample companies. Close to 42% of the sample companies
are MNCs. Majority of the companies (92%) have between 5 to 10 directors silting in their board of
directors, About 70% of the sample companies are audited by Big 4 auditors and half of the companies
have their own internal audit departments.
f tht f f'fT bl 1 0a e : escrIPlIve s a IS ICS 0 e samOle companres
Categories Frequency %
Category MNCs 98 41.70
Domestic companies 137 58.30
235 100.00
Board size Less than 5 directors 10 4.26
5 - 6 directors 64 27.23
7 - 8 directors 94 40.00
9 - 10 directors 58 24.68
More than 10 directors ~ 3.83
Total 235 100,00
External audit Audited by Big 4 166 70.64
Audited by Non Big 4 69 29.36
235 100.00
Internal audit In-house internal audit department 116 49.36
function Outsource I Co-source 119 50.64
No internal audit function 235 100.00
The data was also checked for normality and multicollinearity. The results of standard tests on skewness
and kurtosis indicate that there is no problem with normality assumption and the variables can
reasonably be considered as normally distributed. Examination of the pairwise correlation
coefficient of all variables also indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem, as the
correlations are below the threshold value of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003, p. 359),
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4.2 Independent t-tests
Independent t-tests are run to examine the differences between the monitoring costs of MNCs
and domestic companies. The results are presented in Table 2. The first four rows of the table
show the total monitoring costs and its components. Generally, the results indicate that the
average total monitoring costs (and all its components) of MNCs are significantly higher than the
average monitoring costs of the domestic companies. The total assets and totai liabilities of
MNCs are also significantly higher than those of domestic companies.
When the performances of MNCs are compared with domestic companies, the findings indicate
that the net profit after tax and EPS for MNCs are significantly higher than those of domestic
companies. However, the results of their asset utilisation ratio appear to suggest that MNCs do
not use their asset efficiently, and the domestic companies seem to have significantly higher
asset utilisation ratio than the MNCs. The ROI of MNCs and domestic companies are not
significantly different.
In terms of board size, MNCs appear to have significantly greater number of directors in their
board, compared to the domestic companies. However, there is no difference between these
two groups in their proportion of non-executive directors sitting in their board. This may be due
to the fact that all the companies have to follow the same rule as required by the Malaysian
Exchange listing requirement. As for the auditors, even though the mean for MNCs are greater
than domestic companies(Refer table 3), the result indicates that there is no significant different
between these two group in their selection of Big 4 auditors.
Table 2' Independent t-tests
MNClDomestic Mean T stat
(p value)
Total monitoring costs MNC 1,394,463 3.484
Domestic 454,752 (0.000)
Total directors' remuneration MNC 433,390 3.555
(NED) Domestic 208,439 (0.001)
Total External auditors' costs MNC 472,810 3.229
Domestic 113,751 (0.002)
Total Internal auditors' costs MNC 488,262 2.396
Domestic 132,561 (0.018)
Total assets MNC 2,789,987,632 2.839
Domestic 688,041,555 (0.005)
Total liabilities MNC 1,538,238,274 2.185
Domestic 315,378,544 (0.031)
NPAT MNC 118,413,590 2.318
Domestic 27,174,033 (0.022)
EPS MNC 14.42 1.765
Domestic 7.14 (0.079)
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Asset utilisation ratio MNC 1.83 -3.711
Domestic 4.23 (0.000)
ROI MNC 16.30 -1.004
Domestic 135.04 (0.317)
Board size MNC 7.82 2.265
Domestic 7.26 (0.024)
Percentage of Non-executive MNC 0.64 -0.024
directors in the board Domestic 0.64 (0.981)
Selection of Big 4 auditor MNC 0.74 1.107
Domestic 0.68 (0.270)
4.3 Regression Analysis
4.3.1 Total monitoring costs and MNC
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis. The result in column 2 of Table 3
indicates that companies which have multinational status have higher monitoring costs
compared to domestic companies. The adjusted R squared for Model 1 is 0.738 and the F-value
of 111.038 is significant (p < 0.000). This adjusted R squared means that close to 74% of the
variation in the total monitoring cots can be explained by this model.
The hypothesis variable is significant and at the expected direction. Hence hypothesis H, is
supported. This finding is consistent with the earlier studies by Luo (2005), Che Ahmad (2001)
and Nimie (2005).
This result can be explained by the complex relationship between headquarters and
subsidiaries. Foreign headquarters and subsidiaries relationship is described as an extended
agency relationship between a corporation and its subsidiaries by Ekanayake (2004), where the
two levels of principal-agent relationship exist in the management control system, that is
between the firm's owners (the principal) with the top management (the agent), and between the
top management (acting as principal) and the divisional managers, as the agents who manage
the decentralised units. Foreign subsidiaries are said to require additional control over
management because of the conflict of interest between the management of the subsidiaries
and the foreign corporate owners, which may be magnified by geographical distance and
national objectives (Nimie, 2005; Luo, 2005; Egolholff, 1984) and cultural distance, strategic and
operational roles and psychological alignment (Roth & O'Donnell, 1996). Nimie further argues
that the owners would be concerned with sub-optimisation where the actions taken should be
beneficial to the subsidiary but also optimal for the organisation as a whole. However, managers
of subsidiaries may favour the interest of the national subsidiary rather than the overall interest
of the organisation. Consequently, the need for monitoring is higher in foreign subsidiaries of
MNCs than in domestically owned subsidiaries. In a Malaysian study by Che Ahmad et al.
(2006), it is argued that foreign companies will incur more agency costs as the distance from the
head-quarter induces a higher level of management monitoring and provide incentives for them
to hire quality auditors.
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Table 3' Results of OLS estimation
MONiTOR = Total mOnitoring costs(ln); DIRAUD = Ratio of director costs to auditing costs; INTEXT = Ratio of
internal audit costs to external audit costs (In); MNC = MNC (Dummy); SIZE = Total assets(ln); COMPLEX =Number
of sUbsidiaries(ln); RECINV = Ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets; L1STSTAT = Board listing
(Dummy); TOBINS'Q = Growth
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent variable: MONITOR DIRAUD INTEXT
Constant 1.679*** 46.29*** -1.846***
(2.729) (5.481) (-3.986)
MNC 0.159** 1.742 -0.142**
(2.116) (1.692) (-2.514)
SIZE 0.533*** -1.877*** 0.129***
(16.00) (-4.106) (5.163)
COMPLEX 0.237*** -0.888 -0.081**
(5.318) (-1.454) (-2.403)
RECINV 0.476** 1.516 0.359**
(2.439) (0.566) (2.443)
LISTAT -0.155 2.943** -0.068
(-1.784) (2.467) (-1.041)
TOBINS' Q 0.095** -0.635 0.083**
(2.001) (-0.974) (2.321)
R Squared 0.745 0.144 0.138
Adj R squared 0.738 0.121 0.115
F statistic 111.038 6.385 6.079
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
..
Notes: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
Another literature argues along the same line by claiming that the effects of global competition
for MNCs force their global organising and decision making to be largely output based, which
requires operational flexibility of the foreign subsidiaries where the power is decentralised (Luo,
2005). This spurs the need for better assurance and monitoring system compared to domestic
companies to ensure that the power delegated is not misused and the decisions made by the
managers Idirectors of the subsidiaries are in the best interest of the organisation as a whole.
Furthermore, it is argued that MNCs report their results in more detail compared to companies
operating in one country only (Jaggi & Low, 2000), which will lead to more monitoring costs to
be incurred such as audit costs. Logically, when more details are reported, more needs to be
audited which leads to more audit effort, and consequently more audit fees will be charged.
Niemi (2005) also claims that audit fees should be higher for the subsidiaries of foreign
companies than their domestically owned counterparts because of the added complexity in its
financial reporting structure and greater need for corporate governance in foreign-owned
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subsidiaries. This is particularly due to the fact that additional sets of financial statements may
be prepared in multiple languages and involve foreign currency transformation and transfer
pricing, which will require additional audit effort! procedures and fees.
An independent t-test which examine the multinational and domestic companies (refer Row 2 in
Table 2) aiso reveals that there is a significant difference between the monitoring costs of MNCs
and domestic companies at p <0.001. The descriptive statistic reveals that the average
monitoring costs for MNCs is RM1,394,463, which is very much higher than the domestic
companies' average monitoring costs of RM454, 753.
4.3.2 MNC and preference between directorship and auditing
Column three of Table 3 presents the multiple regression analysis used to test hypothesised H2.
The adjusted R squared for Model 2 is 0.121 and the F-value of 6.385 is significant (p < 0.000).
This adjusted R squared means that more than 12% of the variation in the ratio of director costs
to auditing costs can be explained by this model. However, the result indicates that multinational
status is not a significant factor in the preference between the directorship and auditing. This
result suggest that while monitoring is important (as indicated in the result in Model 1), the
preference between directorship and auditing is less clear. Such results deserve further analysis
in future research.
4.3.3 MNC and preference between internal and external auditing
Column four of Table 3 presents the regression analysis used to test the hypothesised variables
for Model 3. The adjusted R squared for Model 3 is 0.115 and the F-value of 6.079 is significant
(p < 0.000). This adjusted R squared means that more than 11 % of the variation in the ratio of
internal auditing costs to external auditing costs can be explained by this model.
The results in Table 3 relating to multinational and domestic companies indicate that companies
which have multinational status have higher monitoring costs in external auditing compared to
internal auditing. This variable is significant and in the expected direction, thus hypothesis H3 is
supported. This notion is consistent with earlier studies (Che Ahmad, 2001; Eichenseher, 1985).
This result may be explained by the need for an independent assurance system to check on the
management of foreign subsidiaries' operations in multinational setting, as the headquarters
need to know whether the overall objectives of the organization are achieved and the
shareholders wealth is maximized or not. Internal audit may be considered to be less
independent compared to external auditors, especially if this function is done in-house. If the
function is outsourced, internal auditors will be reporting to the audit committee, which is the
subcommittee of the board of directors of the subsidiaries. On the other hand, external auditors
are outsiders and a third party who report to the shareholders of the company, thus they are
viewed to be more independent to report on the subsidiaries' operation to the foreign
headquarters compared to the internal auditors.
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Furthermore, due to the perceived needs of international standards and high quality auditing of
these organisations, which operate internationally and involve complex transactions (such as
consolidated accounts, more detail reporting and currency transformation), it is claimed that
headquarters in foreign control companies are likely to hire brand name auditors with
international reputation (Che Ahmad, 2001). This is supported by an earlier study in US, by
Eichenseher (1985), who reveals strong evidence of the tendency of MNCs to employ brand
name auditors as compared to domestic companies. Even though the independent t-test in
Table 2 (refer the last row) indicates that there is no significant difference between MNCs and
domestic companies in their selection of Big 4 auditors, but the mean for MNCs in selecting the
Big 4 appear to be higher compared to the mean for domestic companies.
Anotrer plausible explanation for the higher external audit costs compared to internal audit cost
incurred by MNCs is due to their appointment of brand name auditors with international
reputation. This appointment of international auditors may also be due to the fact that the
organisations want to portray that their financial reporting is consistent with worldwide
standards, with the hope that it can ease their dealing with foreign investors and headquarters
or subsidiaries. It is said that auditors with international reputation charge companies at a
premium (Chan et aI., 1993; Pong & Whittington, 1994; Anderson & Zhegal, 1994; Palmrose,
1986) which lead to higher external audit costs compared to internal audit costs, and results in a
negative relationship as indicated in this study.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The major purpose of this study is to investigate the demand and preference for monitoring
mechanisms by MNCs in Malaysian business environment. The results indicate that MNCs
demand significantly greater monitoring costs compared to domestic companies. This may be
due to the global and complex environment of MNCs and the physical and cultural distances
which make control and monitoring for the parent-subsidiary level a much greater problem in
multinational than in domestic companies. However multinational status is not significant when
the cost of directorship and auditing are compared. But when internal auditing and external
auditing costs are compared, the result indicates that companies with multinational status have
significantly more external auditing costs. This result is consistent with prior studies and this
result may be explained by the need for an independent assurance system to check on the
management of foreign subsidiaries' operations in multinational setting, as the external auditors
are viewed as more independent than internal auditors.
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